主 题： Social Ties and the Selection of China's Political Elite
We examine the role of social ties in the selection of China's Politburo, the country's highest governing body. We use hometown, college, and workplace ties to current Politburo members as measures of connectedness, and obtain the counterintuitive finding that hometown and college ties are negative predictors of selection: after controlling for candidate birth city and college of attendance, hometown and college ties are each associated with a 7 - 10 percentage point reduction in selection probability. The “connections penalty” is stronger in the Mao era, consistent with strong anti-factionalist sentiment as a primary explanation for our finding, and it is weaker for more senior members of the Politburo, consistent with a role for intra-group competition. We do not find support for other prominent explanations, including geographic quotas or competition between groups. Our results suggest that at least for the most visible and heavily scrutinized levels of the Chinese polity, connections may be a liability rather than an asset.
汪勇祥教授2010年毕业于Columbia Business School，现为南加州大学Marshall商学院金融学副教授（终身教职），目前研究方向集中于实证公司金融，政治经济学，组织经济学，中国经济等相关研究。汪教授的文章发表在顶尖经济学，金融学和管理学期刊，包括Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, American Economic Journal (Applied Economics), Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies，Management Science, 以及Administrative Science Quarterly等杂志。汪教授同时为经济学，金融学，管理学，会计学，社会学，法律，政治学，科学等不同学科的顶尖学术期刊审稿。他的研究获得了美国、英国、澳大利亚，以及中国国家自然基金的资助。他的研究被Wall Street Journal, Business Week, The Economist, New York Times, Science等经济、金融和科学媒体报道。